Although an efficient design of franchise contracts requires from the franchisor to choose a bundle of contractual restraints as safeguarding and control mechanism, previous research has not explored the antecedents of contractual restraints as a bundle of contractual clauses. To address this gap, the aim of this study is to explain the determinants of the most important contractual restraints (i.e., exclusive dealing, exclusive territory, tying, resale price maintenance, call option, leasing, alienation, and noncompetition clauses), using transaction cost and relational governance reasoning. The regression results based on primary data from German and Swiss franchise systems provide support of hypotheses.
The primary contribution of the study is to show that environmental uncertainty has a U-shaped relationship with the number of contractual restraints included in franchise contracts. In particular, we contribute to transaction cost theory (TCT) by combining adaptation and control views of governance to argue that the franchisor incentivizes its franchisees to acquire and share local market information by using lower contractual control (i.e., fewer contractual restraints) under low to moderate levels of environmental uncertainty and realize transaction cost savings by using higher contractual control under high levels of uncertainty. In other words, we show that there is a trade-off between the negative impact of contractual restraints on franchisees' local responsiveness under low to moderate uncertainty and the positive impact of contractual restraints on the franchisor control under high uncertainty. In addition, the franchisor's transaction-specific investments and contract duration, which serve as safeguarding mechanisms, positively influence the use of contractual restraints in franchising. In contrary, franchisees' transaction-specific investments, which serve as a bonding mechanism, negatively influence the use of contractual restraints in franchising. Furthermore, by applying relational governance reasoning, we show that the franchisor's trust as an informal governance mechanism negatively influences the degree of contractual restraints in franchising. Hence, this study also contributes to the literature of networks by showing that the relational view complements TCT to explain the franchisor's use of contractual restraints, which consequently may minimize the goal conflict among franchise partners (Nevin, 1995) and hence alleviate transaction costs and increase added value potential for end consumers. Thus, our findings are important for the management of franchise networks, because contract design is one of the main drivers of competitive advantage and franchise system performance (Azoulay & Shane, 2001; Shane, 1998) .
The remaining structure of this study is organized as follows: In Section 2, the relevant contractual restraints in franchising are discussed. In Section 3, the hypotheses are developed. Subsequently, the data collection, methods, and results are presented. Discussion and conclusions follow.
| OVERVIEW OF CONTRACTUAL RESTRAINTS IN FRANCHISE CONTRACTING
The most common form of restraints in retail contracts is the exclusive dealing clause (Lafontaine & Slade, 2014) . It refers to a situation when franchisees agree not to offer services or products of competitors, thus dealing with the franchisor's single brand (Marvel, 1982) . According to Scherer and Ross (1990) , exclusive dealing assures a franchisor that its products or services will be sold with maximum effort. Further, Sass (2005) demonstrates that exclusive dealing impacts manufacturer-dealer conflict mitigation and social welfare enhancement. However, Heide, Dutta, and Bergen (1998) argue that, as exclusive dealing imposes costs on final customers, this may discourage firms from specifying such arrangements contractually.
The use of tying arrangements in franchise contracts implies a situation where the franchisor obliges franchisees to buy all or at least a proportion of their supplies from the franchisor or from its appointed suppliers. This contractual clause is mainly used to lower franchisors' monitoring costs, improve quality control, or protect goodwill (Michael, 2000b) . For instance, Michael (2000b) show that although tying is not affected by market or outlet share, it is positively influenced by the equipment required and negatively affected by local advertising.
Exclusive territory assures franchisees that the franchisor will not establish new franchised or company-owned outlets nearby the specified territory (Lafontaine & Slade, 2014) . For instance, Ingram and Baum (1997) report that chain hotels in Manhattan are less successful in the presence of other operating units. Dutta et al. (1999) find that territorial restrictions reduce a manufacturer transaction costs from its distributor's free-riding and information asymmetry when transaction-specific investments are high. Kalnins (2004) finds that adding new units to franchised areas significantly reduces the revenues of other incumbent units, whereas this is not the case for company-owned outlets. To determine whether the exclusivity clause mitigates encroachment conflicts for both franchise partners, Nair, Tikoo, and Liu (2009) formulate an analytical model that supports this view.
Price restrictions in franchise chains occur when the franchisor gains control over the chain's pricing strategy, recommending either minimum floors or maximum ceilings (Perry & Besanko, 1991) . Such a contractual arrangement prevents intrabrand price competition, thus encouraging the franchisor to undertake intangible advertising and marketing investments (Rey & Verge, 2008; Schmidt, 1994; Windsperger, 2002) . Blair and Lafontaine (1999) examine whether restricting prices violate antitrust regulations. They report that limiting the maximum prices would incentivize franchisees to compete through other means and thereby enhance consumer welfare.
To encourage a more entrepreneurial relationship, the franchisor offers the lease option to franchisees instead of a tenancy. The lease right serves as a hostage, that is, a means by which the franchisor can control franchisees and reduce monitoring costs, as franchisees can be asked to move out and return their valuable context-specific investments to the leaseholder, that is, the franchisor (Dnes, 1992 (Dnes, , 1993 .
With the call option clause, the franchisor obtains the legal right to acquire franchisee-owned outlets at the termination of the contract. In addition to the strategic value creation function, an explicit call option specified in franchise contracts has a safeguarding/control function (Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017) . Under the call option right, the franchisor can better protect its transactionspecific investments from potential franchisee opportunistic behavior (Reuer & Tong, 2005) .
The noncompetition covenant obliges franchisees not to undertake the same business activities within their former franchise territories for a certain period (Dnes, 1993) . Restrictions on postcontract competition can deter franchisees from free-riding behavior (Dnes, 2008) .
In sum, we can conclude that the contractual restraints are efficiency-enhancing mechanisms in franchising networks. In the following, we examine the antecedents of using contractual restraints as a bundle of contractual clauses.
| DETERMINANTS OF CONTRACTUAL RESTRAINTS

| Transaction cost hypotheses
TCT is an important theoretical perspective for the empirical analysis of contracts (Hendrikse et al., 2015; Lafontaine & Slade, 2014) by highlighting that certain types of transaction attributes (e.g., transaction-specific investments and uncertainties) are predictors of the choice of contract terms and governance structures (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1985) .
| Environmental uncertainty
Uncertainties result from the inability of partners to specify all exchange contingencies in contracts ex ante or to evaluate performance ex post. This view assumes that economic actors are bounded rational (Williamson, 1985) . The majority of scholars agree that environmental uncertainty including institutional, cultural, or economic factors aggravate the problem of bounded rationality in designing more complete contracts, which, in turn, influences transaction costs and the design of firms' governance structures (Gulati, Lawrence, & Puranam, 2005; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1991) .
Specifically, in response to increased transaction costs due to high environmental uncertainty, TCT predicts that firms increase control by vertical integration. However, not all transaction cost proponents agree on the direction of influence that environmental uncertainty has on firms' governance structures (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006; Klein, 1989; Walker & Weber, 1984) . As Klein (1989: 256) states regarding uncertainty, "… different facets of it lead to both a desire for flexibility and a motivation to reduce transaction costs." As a result, we argue that two views of governances should be considered simultaneousely: the adaptation view and the control view of governance.
The adaptation view argues that the franchisor needs to adapt standardized business formats to the specifics of the local market environment (Gulati et al., 2005) . This view encompasses the need to adapt contract design to the needs of franchise partners serving as an adjustment mechanism to increase franchisees incentives for information acquisition and sharing (Gibbons, 2005) . Given that the level of dependencies between the network partners is relatively high, more information sharing and communication are required to protect such relationships against exchange hazards (Williamson, 1991) . Accordingly, this view ascertains that more autonomy under environmental uncertainty creates information-processing benefits and reduces leaks and delays in transmitting the flow of information between the network partners (Colombo & Delmastro, 2004; Zabojnik, 2002) . Thus, in the presence of environmental unpredictability, partners are willing to remain more flexible (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986; Klein, 1989; Teece, 1992) . Flexibility can be obtained if less formal authority is exercised through fewer contractual restraints.
Contrary to the above approach, the control view of governance argues that, under high environmental uncertainty, firms cope more effectively with uncertainty by increasing the level of control (Williamson, 1975) . The control rights are more specified in contracts which serve to regulate exchanges of supplies, monitor quality, propose maximum price levels, and set sales targets, among other factors. Stinchcombe (1990) states that firms specify more elements of hierarchical control in business relations under a higher level of environmental uncertainty. Similarly, Noordewier, John, and Nevin (1990) show that environmental uncertainty is positively related to the level of control in interfirm alliances. Thus, the extent of contingencies that could weaken the franchisor-franchisee relationship grows when the environment becomes more uncertain, which, in turn, increases the need for more contractual safeguards (Williamson, 1975 , Williamson, 1985 . Such safeguarding restraints, even if costly to enforce and rarely exercised under conditions of high environmental uncertainty, increase the positive impact of "unexercised threats" (Bradach, 1998) and thereby reduce transaction costs and preserve the franchisor's transaction-specific investments.
Consequently, accounting for both views, we argue that there is a U-shaped relationship between environmental uncertainty and the degree of contractual restraints used in franchise contracts. In compliance with the adaptation view, a lower degree of contractual restraints will increase franchisees' incentives for information acquisition and knowledge sharing. However, as the level of uncertainty increases, the benefits of specifying a higher number of restraints in contracts 
| Transaction-specific investments
The second transaction cost dimension is transaction-specific investments. Assets which are tailored to a specific partnership include tangible assets, for example, business premises, facilities, and equipment, along with intangible assets, such as training and human capital (Anderson & Weitz, 1986; Watson, Stanworth, Healeas, Purdy, & Stanworth, 2005) .
When a franchise network starts expanding, the franchisor needs to undertake important specific investments to reap the rewards of relationship-specific quasi-rents (Katz, 2008) . Such investments might be threatened by potential opportunistic franchisees, as specific assets cannot be easily redeployed beyond the relationship (Hendrikse et al., 2015; Williamson, 1975) . Thus, asset specificity encourages the franchisor to assign more contractual restraints that mitigate opportunism.
However, in situations where the quasi-rent stream due to franchisees' transaction-specific investments exceeds the gains from opportunism, the franchisor might design contracts by specifying fewer contractual restraints in response to joint relationship-specific investments (Hendrikse et al., 2015) . This occurs when franchisees' transaction-specific investments signal that opportunistic behavior is unlikely to occur (Michael, 2000a 
| Contract duration
TCT predicts that in a long-term exchange relationship, the franchisor attempts to identify future contingencies and to prevent contractual hazards by incorporating more contractual safeguards (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1975 Williamson, , 1985 . Hence, longer contracts require more contractual restraints that are used to attenuate future conflicts and enhance partners' commitment (Joskow, 1985; Williamson, 1985) .
According to Joskow (1987) , p. 169) "A long-term contract that specifies the terms and conditions for some set of future transactions ex ante, provides a vehicle for guarding against ex post performance problems."
Hence, this can lead to reduced ambiguity about franchise partners' contractual obligations and enhances their incentives for specific investments and thereby lowers the likelihood for opportunism. Therefore, 
| Relational governance hypotheses
TCT perspective is limited in explaining franchise relationships as it neglects the dimension of relational complexity within franchise systems (Pizanti & Lerner, 2003) . The relational governance approach argues that trust, norms, and solidarity are particularly important for sustaining exchange relationships (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Heide & John, 1992; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Zhang & Zhou, 2013) . Specifically, trust increases cooperation, reduces the negative effects of conflicts (Anderson & Narus, 1990) , and dilutes agency problems in franchise networks (Cochet & Garg, 2008) . Further, trust facilitates strategic changes carried out by the franchisor (Croonen, 2010) , increases franchisees' satisfaction (Dickey, Harrison McKnight, & George, 2008) , and improves the level of franchisee-compliant behavior (Davies, Lassar, Manolis, Prince, & Winsor, 2011; Dickey et al., 2008) . Hence, as contracts cannot specify all contingencies, governance based on trust can reduce opportunism, mitigate transaction costs, and increase satisfaction.
Previous research has used different concepts and measures to capture the construct of trust (Das & Teng, 2004; Ganesan, 1994; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002; McAllister, 1995) . In organization theory, there is a differentiation between general trust and experience-based trust (Hendrikse et al., 2015) . General trust refers to a situation in which an individual has a positive trustworthy attitude toward others by default, even with no previous interactions (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) . Prior to partnership initiation, if franchise partners hold a high level of trust, they also tend to expect lower relational risks (Das & Teng, 2004; Griessmair, Hussain, & Windsperger, 2014) . From the franchisor perspective, this implies that high levels of general trust lead to the perception of lower relational risks and results in choosing fewer contractual restraints in franchise contracts. Formally, Hypothesis 4a. General trust will negatively influence the degree of contractual restraints in franchise contracts.
As supported by the interorganizational network literature, successive collaborations between network partners can lead to trust and interorganizational routines (Dyer, 1997; Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997; Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002) . Franchise partners' prior positive experience signals credibility and trust (Anderson & Weitz, 1989) .
Further, repeated interactions facilitate and improve the mutual understanding of partners' managerial expectations, organizational culture, and operations (Gulati, 1995) . Therefore, trust developed through previous interactions lessens the potential for post-contract transaction costs, such as monitoring and dispute resolution.
Consequently, the franchisor's trust based on prior experience regarding its franchisees reduces the need for formal restraints in franchise contracts (Reuer & Arino, 2007 
| EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
| Data collection
To test these hypotheses, data were collected from the franchise systems in Germany and Switzerland. To refine and improve the questionnaire, several interviews were conducted with franchise professionals from the respective franchise associations. Twenty franchisors in Austria participated in the final modification process. They suggest that to ensure a more confident level of knowledge about the franchise partners, questionnaires should aim at respondents with a minimum number of years of interorganizational experience and a minimum network size (e.g., number of outlets). Thus, it was decided that any system selected should have started franchising at least 2 years prior to the study and should have at least five operating outlets to be considered a useful observation. As a result, out of 1,013 systems listed by the German Franchise Federation and the Swiss Franchise Association, the questionnaire was mailed to 667 German and Swiss franchise systems.
The questionnaires were sent to senior managers who were con- responses are used for the analysis. To trace the likelihood of nonresponse bias, the results obtained from both late and early respondents were examined to see if they were significantly different (Armstrong & Overton, 1977) . The late respondents, which include those who completed the questionnaire 4 weeks after the first group of respondents, served as proxies for nonrespondents. The analysis of variance test revealed no significant difference between the two respondent groups.
Further, the common method variance was tested by conducting a single factor analysis of the items of all subjective measures, which revealed three distinct factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0.
The first component explains 23.11% of the variance, whereas all of them taken together explain 64.61% (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988) . Thus, Harman's single-factor test negates the possibility of confounded interpretations since no factor accounts for most of the variance.
| Measures
| Dependent variable
Contractual restraints represent the variable of interest. The most important contractual restraints used in franchise contracting were utilized in this study, such as exclusive territory, exclusive dealing, tying and noncompetition arrangements, resale price maintenance, lease control, real option and alienation rights. Franchisors were asked to indicate whether they use restraint clauses in their contracts (1 if yes, 0 otherwise). Table 1 contains the relative frequency of contractual clauses that restrain the cooperation between the franchise partners. The exclusive territory clause is most frequently used, followed by the exclusive dealing clause, whereas lease control is the least frequently applied contractual restraint.
The operationalization of this measure follows that used by Parkhe (1993) and Reuer and Arino (2007) . Hence, the different types of franchise restraints are arrayed in increasing order of strength or severity to arrive at a global measure that represents the degree of franchise contractual restraints that are in use. Contractual restraint stringency is derived using the following weighting scheme:
where DCRF represents the degree of used contractual restraints in franchising, A i equals i if the ith restraint is employed, and zero if not (Parkhe, 1993 
where Bi equals 1 if the ith restraint was employed and zero otherwise. The unweighted dependent variable is estimated using ordered probit models ranging from 0 to 8.
Finally, we additionally applied a dichotomous categorization on the dependent variable, where the variable is coded 1 if more than half of the restraints are assigned and 0 otherwise. The dichotomous dependent variable is estimated using probit models ranging from 0 to 1. Assuming equivalent stringency of individual restraints, this approach should increase the explanatory power of individual covariates on the dependent variable given its dummy categorization and thus more clearly reveal the influence of the chosen antecedents.
Thus,
where τ equals the threshold of four restraints.
| Independent variables
Except for contract duration, prior experience, and franchisees' transaction-specific investments, all other explanatory constructs were assessed via multi-item measures. Franchisors were asked to rate all items on a 7-point Likert scale (see Appendix A).
Environmental uncertainty was adopted from Celly and Frazier (1996) and John and Weitz (1988) . We asked franchisors to assess three items based on 7-point Likert scale regarding their possibility to forecast development and fluctuations of outlet sales, the unpredictability of the local market, and volatility of the local economic situation. The reliability of this measure was assessed using Cronbach's α (α = 0.748) and, following confirmatory factor analysis, the average variance extracted (AVE = 0.65). Note. "Yes" means that the contractual restraint was included in the contract.
Franchisors' transaction-specific investments
are measured by the average investments required to open a franchised outlet (Dnes, 1993) . Contract duration refers to the number of contract years; on average franchisees are initially granted close to 7-year contracts.
The measures used to test the relational governance hypotheses (H4a/H4b) are general trust and prior experience as a proxy for experience-based trust. Similar to previous studies on general trust (e.g., Lazzarini, Miller, & Zenger, 2008; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) , 
| Control variables
To account for possible confounders, we initially control for size, which represents the total number of franchised and company-owned outlets. Smaller firms might lack the necessary resources and capabilities to craft sophisticated contractual agreements (Reuer & Arino, 2007) . Further, larger firms may have a higher control capacity (Erramilli & Rao, 1993) . We also incorporated a dummy variable to control for sectoral effects (0 for service firms, 1 for product franchising firms). Intangible assets (e.g., local market know-how, knowledge transfer, monitoring capabilities) vary between different sectors. Service franchising firms might need more intangible assets compared with product franchising firms (Zeithaml, Parasuraman, & Berry, 1985) . Finally, multiunit franchising (MUF) allows a franchisee to open two or more outlets at specified geographical territories under the same franchise brand. Hence, the franchisor may need to make more context-specific investments tailored to the broader geographical area of its multiunit franchisees. In order to safeguard such additional specific investments against potential opportunism, the franchisor might specify more contract terms. To control for the effect of MUF, we derived this variable as a ratio of franchised outlet to the number of franchisees (Gomez, Gonzalez, & Vazquez, 2010; Hussain & Windsperger, 2013) .
| RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients are reported in Table 2 . Because few variables (e.g., size, contract duration, or prior experience) show high standard deviations or nonnormal distributions, natural logarithms were employed in OLS estimations. In addition, variance inflation factors (ranges from 1.13 to 8.36) indicate that multicollinearity does not affect the results of our analysis.
The multivariate analysis is presented in Table 3 . The second hypothesis (2a) that predicts a positive influence of the franchisor's transaction-specific investments on the degree of specified contractual restraints is supported by all models. To safeguard the franchisor's specific investments from potential opportunism, franchise contracts contain more contractual restraints (Hendrikse et al., 2015) .
However, the prediction that franchisees' specific investments (2b) will negatively impact the degree of specified restraints in franchise contracts is weakly supported in the models M4, M5, and M6. This might be explained by the fact that the franchisor with strong brand reputation may exercise more bargaining power to standardize and formalize contracts (Kidwell, Nygaard, & Silkoset, 2007) .
The hypothesis that the contract duration (3) positively influences the number of contractual restraints is also empirically supported. As long-term cooperation increases the unpredictabilities about future environmental or behavioral contingencies, the franchisor will specify more contractual restraints. Finally, consistent with the predictions of the relational governance view (4a and 4b), our data provide support for the hypotheses that trust, and prior experience negatively influence the specification of explicit contractual restraints in franchise networks. Negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement costs are lower in relationships between network partners with higher trust (Das & Teng, 2004) .
Moreover, the results show that when the franchisor employs MUF, it specifies more restraints to safeguard its greater specific investments. The investigation of clauses applying alternative weighting schemes for the stringency of restraints and the dichotomous categorization of the dependent variable reveals the robustness of the results (see Table 3 ).
| DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Despite the growing evidence that decision control and contractual restrictions influence the performance and survival of franchise systems (Azoulay & Shane, 2001; Hajdini, Klapper, Rommer, & Windsperger, 2017; Shane, 1998) , previous research has not explored the antecedents of the most important contractual restraints as a bundle of contractual clauses in franchising (Cochet & Garg, 2008; Dutta et al., 1999) . To address this gap, the aim of this study was to explain the determinants of contractual restraints in franchise contracting by using transaction cost and relational governance reasoning.
The study provides evidence for a U-shaped relationship between environmental uncertainty and the degree of specified contractual restraints, thereby contributing to TCT literature. More precisely, Note. N = 116. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
FIGURE 1 U-shaped relationship between the degree of contractual restraints and environmental uncertainty combing adaptation and control views of governance, we showed that the franchisor is more likely to reduce the number of restraints to increase franchisees' motivation for information acquisition and sharing when there is a low to moderate environmental uncertainty.
However, when the level of uncertainty increases, the economic value-increasing effect of specifying a higher number of restraints exceeds the incentive-related benefits due to franchisees' higher motivation for information acquisition under fewer contractual restraints. Further, under conditions of high environmental uncertainty, the inclusion of additional contractual restraints can increase the effect of contractual threats and reduce transaction costs (Bradach, 1998; El Akremi et al., 2011) .
Consistent with the TCT (Williamson, 1985) , this study shows how franchise partners' transaction-specific investments and the length of contract influence the degree of specified restraints in franchise contracting. More specifically, we complement prior studies on individual restraints by demonstrating that from the bundle of eight contractual clauses the franchisor uses more restraints for safeguarding purposes. In addition, the empirical results indicate that in response to high transactions costs associated with long-term contracts, the franchisor uses more contractual restraints.
Although there is evidence in the relational governance literature that trust is an important informal governance mechanism in various interorganizational configurations (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995; Heide & John, 1992) , this study demonstrates that the relational view complements the TCT perspective to explain the franchisor's choice of contractual restraints. The results indicate that trust as a relational norm can serve as an informal control mechanism that reduces the requirement to use more formal restraints in franchise contracts. This can be explained by the fact that when the franchisor has a high level of general and experience-based trust, it expects lower relational risks (Das & Teng, 2004; Griessmair et al., 2014) .
The results of the study have important implications for the design of franchise contracts. First, if uncertainties are perceived as high and the franchisor's transaction-specific investments are high relative to the franchisees', the franchisor uses more contractual restraints to utilize their efficiency-enhancing properties and safeguard its transaction-specific investments. However, the franchisor has to consider that franchisees are incentivized under a lower level of contractual control to acquire local know-how and react more flexibly to local customer needs. Second, this study shows that general and experience-based trust reduce the requirement of formal contractual restraints. Hence, the franchisor may provide franchisees with more autonomy (i.e., less contractual restraints) when general and experience-based trust are high. This enables the franchisor to realize transaction cost savings in contract design, direct control, and monitoring mechanisms.
The study has two important limitations. Future research may investigate which contractual restraints are in favor of the franchisor and which are in favor of franchisees to explain the efficient bundling of contractual restraints. In addition, this study has not examined the performance outcome of contractual restraints; hence, future research may focus on performance consequences of different bundles of contractual restraints in franchising networks.
Overall, this is the first empirical study that examines the determinants of contractual restraints from a bundle of clauses in franchise contracts. Based on TCT and relational governance views, we develop a new model that explains the conditions under which efficiencyenhancing contractual restraints are specified in franchise contracts.
In addition, this study adds to the literature of relationships between formal and relational governance mechanisms by showing that trust is an important behavioral prerequisite to use fewer contractual restraints in franchise contracts (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Ryu, Min, & Zushi, 2007) .
